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IN RE TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY—
MARRIED COUPLES, COMMON LAW MARRIAGES,
AND SAME-SEX PARTNERS:
ORTH V. ORTH
JOHN V. ORTH∗

I.

BACKGROUND

An article in a recent issue of the North Dakota Law Review recommends the traditional version of tenancy by the entirety for married couples,
common law marriages, and same-sex partners, and defends the tenancy
against critics who advocate that it should be “abolished, altered, or limited.”1 The author, Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, reviews the characteristics
of the three modern concurrent estates—tenancy in common, joint tenancy,
and tenancy by the entirety—and concludes that tenancy by the entirety is
“the best alternative for couples owning property” because it provides both
“asset protection and probate avoidance.”2
Each tenant in common has a share that is alienable inter vivos, devisable at death, and inheritable in the absence of a valid will. By contrast, each
joint tenant has a share that is alienable, but neither devisable nor inheritable. Alienation by a joint tenant has the effect of withdrawing the alienated
share from the joint tenancy and converting the title to that share into a
tenancy in common. If not alienated, the share of a dying joint tenant does
not pass by devise or inheritance, but inures to the benefit of the surviving
joint tenant or tenants by right of survivorship, thereby avoiding probate.
The peculiar character of an interest in joint tenancy—an interest in fee
simple that is alienable, but neither devisable nor inheritable—is both its
chief advantage and its most serious drawback. As one court recently
observed:
The right of survivorship makes joint tenancies a popular form of
property ownership. Yet, the concomitant right of each joint tenant to destroy the joint tenancy, and thus the right of survivor∗William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University. Professor
Orth contributes the chapters on concurrent estates to THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (David A.
Thomas ed., 1994 (1st ed.); 2004 (2d ed.); & annual supplements).
1. Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Traditional Version is the Best
Alternative for Married Couples, Common Law Marriages, and Same-Sex Partners, 84 N.D. L.
REV. 23, 49 (2008).
2. Id. at 34.
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ship, is not always popular, particularly for the surviving joint tenant. As Hamlet observed in a different context, “ay, there’s the
rub.”3
Unique among the concurrent estates, the traditional tenancy by the entirety,
limited to married couples, does not permit alienation by either tenant; that
is, neither tenant acting alone can sever the tenancy by sale or partition
thereby destroying the right of survivorship. Nor can either tenant
individually encumber the property. For this reason, Rosich-Schwartz
concludes that the traditional tenancy by the entirety is not only the best
alternative for married couples, but also that it should be extended to
couples joined by common law marriage and to same-sex partners.
Rosich-Schwartz identified me, Professor John V. Orth, as the principal
critic of the traditional tenancy by the entirety.4 According to RosichSchwartz, I believe that the tenancy by the entirety “should be abolished.”5
Rosich-Schwartz also (somewhat inconsistently) asserts that I believe it
should be expanded “to make it available to all individuals.”6 RosichSchwartz maintains that “[as] stated by Professor Orth, one of the main
criticisms of the tenancy by the entirety is that it looks more like a joint tenancy than the original tenancy by the entirety ever appeared.”7 RosichSchwartz states as my position that the tenancy should be abolished because
it is now practically indistinguishable from a joint tenancy”8 and that “the
tenancy by the entirety does not provide the ‘easy escape hatch’ that is currently provided to joint tenants in the form of partition or alienation of the
property.”9 While Rosich-Schwartz cites only my article, she states that
“[o]ther critics argue that current judicial decisions confuse and complicate
the application of tenancy by the entirety, creating the need for improvisations of the traditional version of the tenancy.”10 According to RosichSchwartz, I state that manipulation by a large majority of jurisdictions “signals the demise of the tenancy.”11 “Another criticism of the tenancy by the
3. In Re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 493 (Iowa 2007).
4. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 49. The other principal critic identified by RosichSchwartz is Professor Peter Carrozzo. Id. at 50. The present author is speaking only for himself
and not for Professor Carrozzo.
5. Id. at 51 n.188 (citing John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the
Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 47-48 (1997)).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 52 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 48).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 53 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 44). If this is a criticism, Rosich-Schwartz is also a
critic. She advocates for the traditional tenancy by the entirety precisely because it prevents
“unilateral conveyances.” Id. at 52.
10. Id. at 53 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46).
11. Id. at 54 n.206 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46).
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entirety concerns the unilateral creditors’ rights upon the property.”12 Relying again only on my article, Rosich-Schwartz argues that “[m]ost critics
believe that this is the biggest flaw of the tenancy by the entirety, because
the tenancy denies attachment of creditors’ rights based on a false belief
that marriage is a unity of two becoming one.”13
The only reservation I have in wholeheartedly agreeing with RosichSchwartz is that I am Professor Orth! Rather than advocating that the
tenancy by the entirety should be “abolished, altered, or limited,”14 I simply
recounted “the strange career of the common-law marital estate” in my
1997 article repeatedly cited by Rosich-Schwartz.15 In fact, I expressly recognized in that article that at least one reason some states retain the traditional tenancy by the entirety is “to provide protection to marital property”16
and that recognition of the traditional tenancy by the entirety in many states
compensates for “a miserly homestead exemption.”17 Like RosichSchwartz, I considered the possibility that the tenancy would someday be
extended to couples that are not, “for one reason or another, legally united”
(that is, to same-sex partners) and concluded that the tenancy by the entirety
could “probably survive the shock.”18 Indeed, I ended my article with the
observation that the tenancy was a hardy survivor for the simple reason
“that people are familiar with it and that, by and large, it works.”19 So convinced am I of the advantages of the traditional tenancy by the entirety, that
my wife and I have held our marital residence for the last thirty years in that
form of concurrent ownership.20

12. Id. at 54 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46).
13. Id. (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46). Rosich-Schwartz notes that I wrote in my 1997
article that treating two persons as one requires “Alice-in-Wonderland logic.” Id. at n.211. The
problem I had in mind could just as easily be demonstrated by a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, The
Gondoliers, in which two claimants to the throne are treated as one king until the correct monarch
can be identified:
Now, although we act as one person, we are, in point of fact, two persons. . . . It is a
legal fiction, and legal fictions are solemn things. . . . It’s all very well to say we act
as one person, but when you supply us with only one ration between us, I should describe it as a legal fiction carried a little too far.
W.S. Gilbert, The Gondoliers, in THE COMPLETE ANNOTATED GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 921 (Ian
Bradley ed., 1996).
14. Id. at 49 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 47-48).
15. Orth, supra note 5, at 35.
16. Id. at 42.
17. Id. at 48.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 48-49.
20. Deed from Thomas Bain Kirchner and wife, Genevieve O. Kirchner to John V. Orth and
wife, Noreen Nolan Orth, (Feb. 26, 1979) (recorded at Orange County, N.C., Registry of Deeds,
Book 306, page 663). By law in North Carolina any conveyance of real property to a husband and
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In defiance of my supposed criticisms of the traditional tenancy by the
entirety, Rosich-Schwartz argues that “[m]ost couples need asset protection
against unilateral conveyances and unilateral creditors, due to the permanent aspect of their relationship.”21 She assumes that this “permanent aspect” exists only in “quasi-matrimonial relationships similar to marriage,”
and that “married couples, common law marriages, and same-sex partners . . . are the only quasi-matrimonial relationships currently in existence.”22 “[U]nmarried individuals owning property outside of any type of
permanent relationship do not need the asset protection available to married
couples and mutual beneficiaries, because most of this property is later devised, sold, or otherwise encumbered as they wish.”23 For these couples,
Rosich-Schwartz seems to think that the alternatives of joint tenancy or
tenancy in common are adequate.
Tenancy by the entirety is only one of the many advantages the law offers to married couples, and while extending its availability to same-sex
partners may be desirable, it would not alone be sufficient to make such
partnerships the legal equivalent of marriage. In a 2003 article that RosichSchwartz did not cite, I reflected on the debate concerning same-sex marriage.24 I reviewed the consequences of legal marriage, particularly the
property consequences, including the availability of tenancy by the entirety,
and observed that same-sex partners, if excluded from legal marriage, can
by other arrangements approximate only some of these consequences. I
then considered whether legal recognition of some form of parallel legal

wife vests title in them as tenants by the entirety “unless a contrary intention is expressed in the
conveyance.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (2007).
21. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 51. While I actually agree with Rosich-Schwartz concerning the desirability of protecting couples against “unilateral conveyances,” I am less comfortable with the blanket protection afforded by the traditional tenancy by the entirety against “unilateral creditors.” As to creditors who voluntarily extended credit to one spouse under circumstances where the marital status of the debtor was known or knowable, I agree with her; but I am
uneasy where the creditor is a tort creditor, who had no opportunity to examine the creditworthiness of the tortfeasor.
22. Id. at 50. I am not sure why Rosich-Schwartz describes married couples as in a “quasimatrimonial relationship.” Married couples are in the only “matrimonial relationship” known to
the law. Common law marriages, where recognized, also create a “matrimonial relationship.” In
fact, the only difference between “married couples” and “common law marriages” concerns the
formality necessary to enter into the legal relationship, although the lack of documentary evidence
of the relationship complicates the recognition of tenancy by the entirety. See, e.g., In Re Veneziale, 267 B.R. 695, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (concerning whether a couple established common law marriage). In the remainder of this article, I will not discuss common law marriages,
focusing instead on same-sex partners.
23. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 51.
24. John V. Orth, Night Thoughts: Reflections on the Debate Concerning Same-Sex Marriage, 3 NEV. L.J. 560 (2003) [hereinafter Orth, Night Thoughts].
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relationship—”reciprocal beneficiary relationship,”25 “civil union,”26
“domestic partnership,”27 “civil partnership”28—providing all the consequences of legal marriage (including tenancy by the entirety) would eliminate the objections to excluding same-sex partners. In other words, I wondered whether there is independent significance to the label “marriage.”
Finally, I asked how, if we decide to extend the consequences of legal marriage, we should decide which same-sex partners to include. In other
words, are all same-sex partners the same?
The last question was prompted by a story I told about two sisters,
Maud and Mary, who lived together for 93 years.29 Their relationship entitled them to no legal benefits. They could not take title to real property as
tenants by the entirety (where that estate is recognized) or hold it as community property (where married persons hold property under that regime).
As a result, they lost valuable protections from creditors’ claims and advantages with respect to inheritance and estate taxation. They could not
check the box “married filing jointly” on their state and federal income tax
returns, which would have entitled them to reduced rates of taxation.30
They were denied survivors’ benefits from private pension plans and from
Social Security. I concluded that, although their relationship was as permanent as humanly possible, “[t]he law simply ignored the fact that they had
lived together as a couple for nearly a century.”31
I realized at the time that my original reflections were not “likely to
please all the participants in the debate concerning same-sex marriage.”32
25. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (2007). The consequences of marriage under the Hawaiian
statute are available to all couples “who are legally prohibited from marrying”—not only “two
individuals who are of the same gender” (that is, same-sex partners), but also “two individuals
who are related to one another.” The statute expressly includes “a widowed mother and her unmarried son”—an example, as I recognized in my earlier reflections, that implicates a “common
stereotype of the male homosexual.” Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 570 n.59.
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:A (2007); N.J. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1201 (1999).
27. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6; 2006 D.C. Law 16-79; 2007 Or. Laws Ch. 99; see also
Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 672 (H.P. 1152; L.D. 1579); id. ch. 347 (H.P. 1256; L.D. 1703).
28. Civil Partnership Act, c. 33 2004 (Eng. & Wales); see Andrew Flagg, Note, Civil
Partnership in the United Kingdom and a Moderate Proposal for Change in the United States, 22
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 613, 614 (2005) (analyzing the British Civil Partnership Act and advocating similar legislation in the United States).
29. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 560-61.
30. Id. at 564-65. In my original reflections, I recognized that for some taxpayers marriage is
actually a disadvantage, incurring the so-called “marriage penalty.” Id.
31. Id. at 561.
32. Id. at 569. I was surprised to see that a prominent opponent of same-sex marriage included my reflections in a list of articles supporting, lauding, or endorsing the argument in favor.
Lynn D. Wardle, The Curious Case of the Missing Legal Analysis, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 309, 309 &
app. A (2003-04). Professor Wardle admitted that he had not read all the articles he mentioned.
Id. He must have skipped my article.
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To the extent that the demand of same-sex partners was a demand for broad
social acceptance of their sexual relationship, I recognized that it might not
be satisfied by permitting euphemistic substitutes, even if the property consequences of these new legal arrangements were identical to the property
consequences attached to marriage.33 And by asking whether couples not
bound by a sexual relationship might also in fairness have a claim to the
same legal consequences as marriage (or its substitute), I wondered whether
the debate was “about fairness in general or about fairness to a particular
sexual minority?”34 My proposal, in other words, was to expand the discussion to include all partners who were excluded for whatever reason. “If sex
could be disregarded,” I wrote, “the debate concerning same-sex marriage
could be transformed into a discussion concerning proper criteria for admission to a legal relationship involving social and economic support: less
sexy, but perhaps thereby more productive.”35 Two cases decided by
prominent courts within weeks of one another in 2008 deal with some of the
issues I raised in that article.36
II. ILLUSTRATIVE JUDICIAL OPINIONS
A. IN RE MARRIAGE CASES
On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court decided In re Marriage Cases, holding that the state could not constitutionally limit legal
marriage to opposite-sex couples.37 The California Constitution’s guarantees of privacy and due process38 encompassed a constitutional right to

33. As a property lawyer, I am perhaps more concerned with consequences than with names.
Whether easement or irrevocable license, inter vivos gift or declaration of trust, real covenant or
equitable servitude, will or will substitute—in property law, if it comes to the same thing, the label
does not really matter. But as a legal historian, I am uncomfortably aware that arguing that the
label does not matter may, when social relations are concerned, be reminiscent of the United
States Supreme Court’s dismissal of the claim that a statute requiring “separate but equal” facilities for the black race was a “badge of inferiority.” “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
34. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 569-70.
35. Id. at 571.
36. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 384 (Cal. 2008); Burden v. The United Kingdom,
App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
37. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 402. On November 4, 2008, California voters adopted
Proposition 8 adding Section 7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”
38. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); id. § 7(a) (“A
person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . .”). While
basing its decision on the state constitution, the California Supreme Court found support for its
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marry, that is, “the opportunity of an individual to establish—with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life—an officially recognized and protected family possessing mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the same respect and dignity accorded a union traditionally designated as marriage.”39 The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection40 meant that a legal distinction could not be drawn without
justification between couples essentially similar. Because the majority
found that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples “wish to enter into a
formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family relationship that affords the same rights and privileges and imposes the same obligations and responsibilities,”41 they held that both were entitled to the legal
status of marriage.42
Although California’s Domestic Partnership Act conferred nearly
identical legal consequences on registered same-sex domestic partners as on
married couples,43 it was constitutionally inadequate because it denied
same-sex partners the label “marriage.”44 Assigning a different designation
to same-sex partners while reserving the historic designation of “marriage”
exclusively for opposite-sex couples posed, the court held, “a serious risk of
denying the official family relationship of same-sex couples the equal dignity and respect that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry.”45
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached the same conclusion on similar facts,46 as did the Connecticut Supreme Court in 200847

reasoning in federal cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the birth control
case, which it referred to as “seminal.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432.
39. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399 (emphasis added).
40. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (“A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the
laws . . .”).
41. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435.
42. See id. at 402.
43. See id. at 416 (describing nine minor differences that remained).
44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (b)(5)(B). The California Domestic Partnership Act also made
domestic partnership available to opposite-sex couples if either is eligible for Social Security and
over 62 years of age. It is unclear whether this part of the Act is still valid.
45. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435. The majority thought a different label was
particularly likely to imply second-class citizenship “because of the widespread disparagement
that gay individuals historically have faced.” Id. at 401-02.
46. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004) (“The dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a considered
choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual,
couples to second-class status.”); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
969 (Mass. 2003) (holding state marriage laws unconstitutional insofar as they denied marriage to
same-sex couples).
47. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (holding Connecticut’s civil union statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn, unconstitutional).
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and the Iowa Supreme Court in 2009,48 although a number of other state
courts have reached the contrary conclusion about the constitutional necessity of recognizing same-sex marriage.49
In my earlier reflections, I suggested that “[t]heoretically the simplest,
but practically the most difficult, solution to the problem would be the elimination of the legal status of marriage.”50 But the California Supreme
Court held that not only is there a constitutional “right to marry” but also
that it obligates the state to take “at least some affirmative action to acknowledge and support the family unit.”51 California must, the court held,
“take affirmative action to grant official, public recognition to the couple’s
relationship as a family.”52
B. BURDEN V. UNITED KINGDOM
Only a few weeks earlier, on April 29, 2008, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights decided Burden v. The United Kingdom,
holding that the United Kingdom, which recognizes same-sex civil partnerships, can refuse legal recognition to a couple formed by two co-habiting
sisters.53 Like Maud and Mary in my original reflections, the Burden sisters
have lived together “in a stable, committed and mutually supportive relationship all their lives.”54 For the last thirty-one years, they have shared a
house built on land they inherited from their parents, real property that has
significantly appreciated in value.55 They hold title to the house and adjoin-

48. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (“the language in Iowa Code section
595.2 limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken”).
49. See generally Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006);
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App.); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d
15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App.). But see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that constitutional guarantee of equal protection required that legislature either amend marriage statutes to
admit same-sex couples or grant domestic partnerships same rights as married couples).
50. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 567.
51. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 (Cal. 2008). The Court did not decide whether
the label “marriage” is a “core element of the state constitutional right to marry” or whether the
state could constitutionally “assign a name other than marriage [as the official designation of the
family . . . relationship] for all couples.” Id. at 434.
52. Id. at 427.
53. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 65-66 (2008),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. The case, filed on March 29, 2005, had previously
been heard by a Chamber within the Fourth Section of the Court, which also had ruled against the
sisters. Burden and Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 4
(Chamber 2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
54. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10 (2008),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
55. Id.
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ing land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.56 Each has savings
and investments in her sole name, and each has executed a will leaving all
her property to the other.57 Age eighty-three and ninety, the sisters have an
“awful fear” that on the death of the first to die, the survivor will be forced
to sell the real estate to satisfy the inheritance tax, requiring her to move
from her familiar surroundings.58 By contrast, the United Kingdom allows
married couples and registered civil partners to pass property tax-free to the
survivor, but civil partnership is not available to the sisters because they are
“within the prohibited degrees of relationship.”59
The sisters’ suit was based on the argument that they will be treated
differently at the death of the first to die from other persons “in relevantly
similar situations” and that this constitutes unlawful discrimination in violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.60 In other words, the sisters argued that they were like a
couple formed by marriage or civil partnership, but denied the legal consequences of those relationships. A majority of judges who heard the case at
first instance in a Chamber within the Fourth Section of the Court agreed
with the applicants that they were indeed similarly situated, but deferred to
56. Id. para. 11.
57. Id.
58. Id. para. 32. One of the dissenting judges in the Chamber was moved by the fact that
“[t]his house is not simply a piece of property–this house is something with which they have a
special emotional bond, this house is their home.” Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No.
13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 1-2 (2006) (Pavlovschi, J., dissenting), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. Of course, the sisters’ financial advisor should have recommended insurance on each sister’s life in an amount sufficient to satisfy the tax. Given the sisters’ advanced
ages, this is now probably impracticable as a solution. In any event, married couples and civil
partners do not need to bear the expense of insurance in order to protect the survivor from a forced
sale.
59. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 17 (2008),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. The Civil Partnership Act 2004 provides that “[a]
couple is eligible to form a civil partnership if they are (i) of the same sex (ii) not already married
or in a civil partnership (iii) over the age of 16 [and] (iv) not within the prohibited degrees of
relationship.” Id.
60. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.” Id. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.
Id.
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the government on the design of its system of taxation.61 In terms of European jurisprudence, the United Kingdom was entitled to a “wide margin of
appreciation.”62 At the sisters’ request, the case was heard anew by the
Grand Chamber of the Court.
The legal representative of the United Kingdom denied that there is a
“true analogy” between the sisters and legal couples, because the sisters are
“connected by birth rather than by a decision to enter into a formal relationship recognised by law.”63 When the Civil Partnership Bill was in progress
of passage through parliament, a government supporter declared that “[t]his
Bill is about same-sex couples whose relationships are completely different
from those of siblings.”64 In response, the sisters argued that they “had chosen to live together in a loving, committed and stable relationship for several decades, sharing their only home, to the exclusion of other partners.”65
Furthermore, they claimed that their choice was “just as much an expression of their respective self-determination and personal development as
would have been the case had they been joined by marriage or a civil
partnership.”66
The Grand Chamber concluded, on the contrary, that “the relationship
between siblings is qualitatively of a different nature to that between married couples and homosexual civil partners.”67 The essential difference, according to the majority of judges in the Grand Chamber, is that siblings are

61. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
62. Burden and Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61
(2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. Two dissenting judges in the Chamber,
while agreeing that states were entitled to a “wide margin of appreciation,” nonetheless thought
that “once the legislature decides that a permanent union of two persons could or should enjoy tax
privileges, it must be able to justify why such a possibility has been offered to some unions while
continuing to be denied to others.” Id. para. 1-2 (Bonello and Garlicki, JJ., dissenting).
63. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61 (2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. The government of the United Kingdom detailed the
differences between the sisters and legal couples:
The very essence of their relationship was different, because a married or Civil Partnership Act couple chose to become connected by a formal relationship, recognised by
law, with a number of legal consequences; whereas for sisters, the relationship was an
accident of birth. Secondly, the relationship between siblings was indissoluble, whereas that between married couples and civil partners might be broken. Thirdly, a married couple and civil partners made a financial commitment by entering into a formal
relationship recognised by law and, if separated, the court could divide their property
and order financial provision to be made by one partner to the other. No such financial commitment arose by virtue of the relationship between siblings.
Id. para. 49.
64. Id. para. 20 (quoting Lord Alli, a Labour peer).
65. Id. para. 53.
66. Id.
67. Id. para. 62.
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joined by consanguinity, while marriage and civil partnership is forbidden
to persons “within the prohibited degrees of relationship.”68 According to
the majority, “[r]ather than the length or the supportive nature of the relationship, what is determinative, is the existence of a public undertaking,
carrying with it a body of rights and obligations of a contractual nature.”69
Since the sisters did not have such a publicly recognized contract, they were
more similar to an unmarried heterosexual couple or an unregistered civil
partnership. The sisters’ argument that they did not have “a publicly recognized contract” because the public would not recognize their contract was
unavailing, leading one of the dissenting judges to say that he found the
majority’s argument “circular, or I might even say concentric.”70
Although the majority discreetly avoided mentioning the sexual basis
of marriage and civil partnership, two judges writing separately did. Judge
Björgvinsson, concurring in the result, recognized the “sexual nature of the
relationship” as one of the “important differences” between the sisters and a
married or civil partnership couple but nonetheless thought the sisters had
more in common than not with such couples for purposes of inheritance
tax.71 Like the Chamber, however, he would have allowed the state discretion to decide when and to what extent to provide exemptions.72 Judge
Zupančič, dissenting, bluntly asked whether it was the nature of the physical relationship that distinguished the couples: “Is it having sex with one
another that provides the rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest?”73
III. CONCLUSION
It is, of course, a bit unfair to read the opinion of the European Court of
Human Rights together with the opinion of the California Supreme Court

68. Id. para. 17.
69. Id. para. 62, 65.
70. Id. para. 3 (Borrego Borrego, J., dissenting). It is at least possible that the result in the
case would have been different if the sisters had begun by seeking, and being denied, registration
as a civil partnership. In explanation of their failure to take this step, the sisters stated that “[t]hey
had not raised a general complaint about their preclusion from entering into a civil partnership,
because their concern was focused upon inheritance tax discrimination and they would have entered into a civil partnership had that route been open to them.” Id. para. 53. On the other hand,
because the majority found that “the relationship between siblings is qualitatively of a different
nature to that between married couples and homosexual civil partners,” that complaint too would
probably have been rejected. Id. para. 62.
71. Id.
72. Id. (Björgvinsson, J., concurring).
73. Id. (Zupančič, J., dissenting). Judge Borrego Borrego added that “[t]his judgment of the
Grand Chamber will no doubt be described as politically correct.” Id. (Borrego Borrego, J.,
dissenting).
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because courts properly answer only the questions asked. The California
Supreme Court was not asked whether it was a violation of privacy, due
process, or equal protection to exclude cohabiting sisters from the benefits
of marriage or domestic partnership.74 The court did, however, emphasize
that its conclusion that “the constitutional right to marry properly must be
interpreted to apply to gay individuals and gay couples does not mean that
this constitutional right similarly must be understood to extend to polygamous or incestuous relationships.”75 The court recognized a “strong and
adequate justification” for denying state recognition to such relationships
“because of their potentially detrimental effect on a sound family environment.”76 Marriage between siblings may continue to be prohibited in
California, even presumably between sisters who did not have (or desire) an
incestuous relationship. But, then, the English sisters were not asking to be
allowed to marry, only to secure the economic benefits accorded married
couples and same-sex partners. Rather than sex, they were concerned about
those other perennials, death and taxes.
Like the California Supreme Court, the European Court of Human
Rights did not have to decide whether denial of the label “marriage” to
same-sex partners was discriminatory.77 As a dissenting judge in the Grand

74. The California Domestic Partnership Act defined “domestic partners” as “two adults who
have chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (Deering 2006). The partners may not be “related by blood in a
way that would prevent them from being married to each other in this state.” Id. § 297(b)(3). The
Act also made domestic partnership available to opposite-sex couples if either is eligible for Social Security and over 62 years of age. Id. § 297(b)(5)(B). It is unclear whether such couples must
now accept the label “marriage.” If domestic partnership remains available for such couples,
perhaps room could be made for the elderly sisters by eliminating the restriction on blood relatives. Counsel for the sisters pointed out to the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
that “there was no requirement in the 2004 [Civil Partnership] Act for those wishing to enter into a
civil partnership to be in a sexual relationship with each other.” Burden and Burden v. The United
Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 50 (2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/
en/hudoc. The Hawaii statute extends the legal consequences of marriage to all couples “who are
legally prohibited from marrying”—not only “two individuals who are of the same gender” (that
is, same-sex partners), but also “two individuals who are related to one another.” HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572C-2 (2006).
75. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434 n.52 (Cal. 2008).
76. Id.
77. The majority of judges on the California Supreme Court thought that “there is no question but that these two categories of individuals [opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples] are
sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection principles that require a court to determine
‘whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.’” Id. at 435 n.54
(quoting from People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 37 (Cal. 2006)). Two dissenting judges in the
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights agreed. Burden and Burden v. The United
Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61 (2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/
en/hudoc. See Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Borrego,
Borrego, J., dissenting) (2008) available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
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Chamber pointed out, the sisters were already a “same-sex couple.”78 The
difficulty they faced was not their sex, but their family relationship. Since
marriage was not involved, the incest taboo was not implicated in the European case. The United Kingdom seemingly had the opportunity to open
civil partnership to sisters in appropriate cases.79 In fact, an amendment actually adopted in the House of Lords during the Civil Partnership Bill’s passage through parliament would have done just that: extend civil partnership
and the associated inheritance tax concession to family members “within
the ‘prohibited degrees of relationship’” if they (i) were over 30 years of
age, (ii) had co-habited for at least 12 years, and (iii) were not already married or in a civil partnership with another person.80 But the House of Commons dropped the amendment because the Bill was “not the appropriate
legislative base” on which to deal with the “concerns of relatives.”81
The California Supreme Court held that “marriage” was the proper label for the “official family relationship of same-sex couples”82 and insisted
upon the need for “official, public recognition” of same-sex partners’ “relationship as a family.”83 The European Court of Human Rights seemed to
agree that a family could be formed only by choice; the sisters were bound
by consanguinity, not by “a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of
rights and obligations of a contractual nature.”84 Family by choice is a
novel concept, at least in the common law, which long based its family law
on relationships of blood—on consanguinity.85 In a paradox worthy of a

78. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Borrego Borrego, J.,
dissenting) (2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
79. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 569 (footnote omitted) (observing in my earlier
reflections that “[t]wo siblings living together for a lifetime could be added without too much
trouble. But what if there were three—or more?”). The Irish government, in its submission to the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, seems to have been concerned about the
same thing: “It would be truly extraordinary if the enactment of legislation conferring rights upon
same-sex couples who chose to register their relationship could have the effect of requiring the
State to extend the entitlements thereby conferred to a potentially infinite class of persons in cohabiting relationships.” Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 57
(2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
80. Id. para. 19.
81. Id. para. 20 (quoting Jacqui Smith, M.P., Deputy Minister for Women and Equality). I
do not know whether the amendment adopted in the House of Lords—or the Burden sisters’ lawsuit—was the product of political maneuvering.
82. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434 (Cal. 2008).
83. Id. at 427.
84. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 65 (2008),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
85. For centuries inheritance was limited to blood relatives. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 208-36 (1765) (listing canons of inheritance). Except for the addition of surviving spouses, it generally still is, which is why, in the absence of a
will, sisters can inherit from one another. See also Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background
of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971) (noting that until legal adoption was
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Gilbert and Sullivan operetta,86 the European Court’s holding was that the
sisters could not form a family because they already were one!—albeit one
that carried none of the legal consequences of a family of choice, formed by
marriage or civil partnership.
Despite modern society’s openness about the biological facts of life,
the judges in these cases, both in California and in Europe, seem surprisingly reticent on the subject, preferring to talk about family, rather than
about sex. Yet the obvious explanation of the results in both cases seems to
be a positive judgment about the sexual basis of same-sex partnerships,
civil and domestic. If the partners’ sex life is qualitatively the same as that
of a traditional married couple’s, then “marriage” is not only the right name,
but the only name, for their relationship. And if a sexual bond is essential
to a marriage or civil partnership, then the sisters’ relationship, however
“stable, committed and mutually supportive” but asexual, is qualitatively
different.
Rather than defending the traditional tenancy by the entirety against
imagined critics, Rosich-Schwartz could more profitably have labored to
defend her argument that the tenancy should be extended to same-sex partners, but no further. In light of the frequency of divorce among married
couples and separation among same-sex partners, as well as the lifelong relationship of certain siblings, the answer might not have been as simple as
the conclusory statement that only couples in “quasi-matrimonial relationships, similar to marriage” have “any type of permanent relationship.”87

recognized—in England by statute in 1926, in America by state legislation beginning around the
middle of the nineteenth century—“children by choice” were unknown).
86. Cf. W.S. Gilbert, The Pirates of Penzance (1879), in THE COMPLETE ANNOTATED
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 239-41 (Ian Bradley ed. 1996) (“a paradox, a paradox, A most ingenious
paradox!”—referring to articles of apprenticeship expiring on the apprentice’s twenty-first birthday when he was born on “leap day,” Feb. 29).
87. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 51.

